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Abstract: We go back to Shannon’s mathematical concept of information and suggest that, on semiotic considerations, 
different types of information must be distinguished of which the Shannon type covers the most simple one 
only. To this end we utilize the isomorphic relation between Peirce’s method to systematically arrange the 
Boolean relations in his X-frame scheme and the arrangement of semiotical terms, indicating the different 
sign aspects that can be discerned in our Knowledge in Formation model. We conclude that although the 16 
Boolean relations can be reduced to NAND or NOR, the semiotic terms are irreducible. We finish with the 
suggestion that an attempt to cover the meaning problem and the effectiveness (Weaver) problem must 
respect this irreducibility. The function of this paper is to raise a question, not to provide an answer.
1 INTRODUCTION 
The information, computer and communication 
sciences mature rapidly. Turing’s universal machine 
(Turing, 1936)1, Shannon’s method for using 
Boolean logic to represent circuits (Shannon, 1937) 
and his mathematical definition of information 
(Shannon, 1948) may be regarded as marking the 
transition from early childhood into the formal 
schooling phase of this living body of knowledge.2 
_________________ 
1 All three papers are retrievable, at least on 20-11-2012, 
from: http://history-computer.com.  
2 Of course this organic metaphor raises the question of 
the moment of conception. Without any wish to push the 
comparison too far, i.e. to suggest a direct relation 
between conceiving the idea to make a contraption that 
executes Boolean operations by means of an electrical 
circuit and actually making one, it is of interest to note 
that Peirce suggested to Marquand, his former pupil, the 
use of electricity, in order to improve the latter’s 
mechanical reasoning machine, as early as 1886, as is 
witnessed by: “I think you might return to the problem, 
especially as it is by no means hopeless to expect to 
make a machine for really very difficult mathematical 
problems. But you would have to proceed step by step. I 
think electricity would be the best thing to rely on.” In 
his letter to Marquand Peirce provided drawings of 
circuits for ‘and’ and ‘or’, cf. p. 422 (Peirce, 1993). 
 
This phase can be characterised as focussed on 
getting basic skills by doing exercises of growing 
complexity. Shannon’s mouse, created in 1950, is 
just one of the numerous examples. The transition 
from the formal schooling phase into apprenticeship 
may be regarded to set in as soon as the stand alone 
solutions fabricated are used in everyday affairs and 
maturity sets in when responsive systems become 
interrelated. 
The resulting ubiquitous need of sensitivity and 
‘knowledge’ on the side of the interpreting systems, 
be they human or non-human, in order to provide the 
right service or response, implies a growth of 
information in quantity and diversity. Knowledge 
about the integration of this diversity of information, 
however, did not grow accordingly. As a result we 
didn’t come to terms with the concept of meaning. 
Semiotics offers the possibility to systematically 
take up this quest for integration without losing 
contact with mathematics. Our Knowledge in 
Formation (KiF) research program is dedicated to 
this goal. 
 
                         
 
Subsequently Peirce wrote more extensively on logical 
machines (Peirce, 1887) and Marquand produced a 
circuit diagram for an electromagnetic logical machine 
around 1890, cf. http://history-computer.com. 
 Below, after some scant words on the history of the 
concept of information (2), we will indicate 
Shannon’s model of communication: we only need 
the general scheme since we accept, but do not need 
the contents of his theory in this paper (2.1). In the 
subsequent paragraphs (2.2.x) we shortly present 
Peirce’s work on the 16 Boolean relations in his X-
frame notation, provide a semiotic interpretation of 
X-frame and spend some words on the difference 
between full Boolean logic (logica docens) and 
naive logic (logica utens). 
In section 3 we will show which sign aspects in 
Peircean semiotics are involved in Shannon’s 
concept of information. 
2 APPROACHES TO THE 
CONCEPT OF INFORMATION 
The concept of information can be traced back to 
ancient Greece. At the basis of all shades of 
meaning, that developed during the ages, lies the 
idea of a form into which matter is moulded. From 
here the notion of information goes in two 
directions. On the one hand there is an 
epistemological line of thought in which the intellect 
knows the object by grasping its form. This may be 
termed the referential meaning of information. On 
the other hand there is an educational line of thought 
in which the transfer of knowledge predominates. 
This may be termed the communicational meaning 
of information. 
In both strains of thought the idea of a measure 
for information did develop. Peirce took the muddy 
end of the stick when he tried to provide a measure 
for the concept of information within the referential 
tradition. Shannon’s successful mathematical 
approach to information clearly belongs to the 
second, communication oriented tradition. Since we 
think it is best to append on Shannon in our attempt 
to get a hold on the meaning problem, here we omit 
a treatment of Peirce’s measure for information. 
2.1 Shannon’s model of communication 
At the start of his 1948 paper Shannon states the 
problem for which he provides his solution: 
 
The fundamental problem of communication is that of 
reproducing at one point either exactly or 
approximately a message selected at another point 
(Shannon, 1948). 
 
Immediately after, he distinguishes his approach 
from the referential tradition:  
 
Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they 
refer to or are correlated according to some system 
with certain physical or conceptual entities. These 
semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to 
the engineering problem.  (Shannon, 1948) 
 
This in order to be able to schematize the essence of 
the communication system he deals with:   
 
Figure 1: Shannon’s model of communication systems 
 
Since we accept Shannon’s analysis of what happens 
in the channel –i.e. a transmitter transforms the 
message into a signal, suited for the kind of channel 
utilized, that is send through the channel to the 
receiver, which in its turn transforms the signal into 
a message, by an inverse procedure– our interest 
goes solely to the information source and the 
destination. 
The information source produces messages, the 
destination is the person (or thing) for whom the 
message is intended, according to Shannon. We take 
this to mean that, in symmetric communication, at 
both sides of the channel there is an agent capable of 
producing and interpreting messages. It is important 
to realize that neither the genesis and purpose of the 
message to be send, nor the interpretation of the 
message is covered by the mathematical theory of 
communication. It is only the efficient and accurate 
transfer of the message between two interpreting 
systems that is covered. 
Shannon acknowledged this when he stated that 
the meaning problem is irrelevant for his 
engineering problem. But this, of course, does not 
mean that it is, in principle, hopeless to get an 
engineering hold on the process of interpretation. 
Weaver clearly was of this opinion when he 
suggested stochastic means to approach at least part 
of the meaning problem: 
 
The idea of utilizing the powerful body of theory 
concerning Markoff processes seems particularly 
promising for semantic studies, since this theory is 
specifically adapted to  handle one of the most 
 significant but difficult aspects of meaning, namely 
the influence of context (Weaver, 1998). 
 
Besides that, he decomposed the meaning problem 
into three levels at which the engineer will meet 
problems. Alongside problems at the technical level, 
there are semantic problems and effectiveness 
problems.3  
Stamper extended the amount of levels from 
three to six, cf. (Liu, 2000). Van Breemen  suggested 
a coordination of the levels distinguished by 
Stamper with the semiotic KiF processing model 
(Van Breemen, 2010), which originally was 
developed by Farkas and Sarbo (Farkas, 2000). In 
section 3, we will show that it is possible to identify 
in KiF the interpretation aspects that are involved in 
Shannon’s mathematical model of communication.  
2.2 Peirce 
Ch.S. Peirce (1839-1914) was an extremely versatile 
thinker. For our present purposes only parts of his 
work on logic (2.2.1) and semiotics (2.2.2) are of 
importance. In section 2.2.3 we will pay attention to 
the distinction Peirce made between a logica utens 
and a logica docens in order to clarify the difference 
between naive (inborn) logic that is used in our KiF 
approach and Boolean logic. This positions our work 
with regard to the logical tradition and is meant to 
prevent the reader to conclude that an equivalence 
relation exists between both logics. 
2.2.1 The Booleans and X-frame notation 
Usually the development of the truth tables is dated 
1912 and attributed to Russel and Wittgenstein. 
Anellis discovered that Peirce did much work on the 
truth tables since 1893. In the course of this work, 
Peirce saw himself confronted with the need to find 
a notation for the 16 Boolean connectives on two 
variables in a systematic way. This led to the 
manuscript A Proposed Logical Notation(Notation), 
ca. 1903 unpublished, in which Peirce, inspired by 
the square of oppositions ‘explored the relation 
between the relations between two terms or 
propositions’ (Anellis, 2011). Clark made an 
extensive study of the manuscript. The treatment 
_________________ 
3 That the technical problem is involved in the meaning 
and effectiveness problems is clearly stated by Weaver: 
Thus the theory of Level A is, at least to a significant 
degree, also a theory of levels B and C. I hope that the 
succeeding parts of this memorandum will illuminate 
and justify these last remarks (Weaver, 1949). 
below is based on (Clark, 1997). Our aim is not to 
promote the actual arrangement of the connectives, 
we only want to utilize the idea behind the set up, 
i.e. the idea that ideally in our intellectual endeavour 
we progress from doubt to belief or logically from 
potential contradiction to trivial tautology. 
In figure 2 the four possible states of things are 
given. In figure 3 the 16 relations are distributed 
over the 4 corners of the 4 quadrants according to a 
system.  
 
Figure 2: The truth values of two interrelated terms are 
given in four quadrants in X-frame. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The X-frame. The symbols for the Boolean 
connectives are put in the 16 corners. 
 
At the bottom of the bottom square we find the sign 
for a contradiction (an occasion for doubt). At the 
top of the top square we find the sign for a tautology 
(an occasion for belief). In this manner ‘each of the 
16 possible assertions may be represented”, cf. 
(Clark, 1997).  
 X-frame is not meant as a process description, 
but it gives all possible different logical relations in 
a dependency structure. However, if we suppose that 
an interpreting system in a given state of information 
(variable A) and an incoming sign as an effect 
(variable B) can be logically related to each other in 
16 different ways, ways that somehow progress 
from potential absurdity to trivial tautology, at the 
most the 4 compartments indicate where an 
interpretation process fails, if it fails. For instance 
failure in passing FT means that the actual effect is 
not-T (it is not interpreted as true), TF that the state 
is not-T, etc. 
 
Consider the following example. You see a shade on 
a panel of your kitchen, it looks like velvet and you 
think “What the heck is a string of velvet doing 
 there?” You walk towards the panel and notice that a 
spoon above the panel is throwing a soft reflection. 
You remove the spoon and the doubt is turned into 
belief. In this example the general impression of the 
kitchen is your state on which a puzzling effect, the 
shadow, appears. You get stuck in your interpreta-
tion process, retrace the process, start with doubting 
the least familiar part of the experience, which in 
this case is the effect (FT quadrant). Since the 
tripartite relation between the state (TF, general 
impression of the kitchen, yet without clear 
understanding of the effect), the effect (FT, the 
velvet impression, without knowing the involved 
state) and the knowledge present in the interpreting 
system, do not lead to an interpreted state - effect 
relation (TT, state and effect are interpreted), the 
interpreting system tries to find a solution and is able 
to reconsider the relations in the FT quadrant, i.e. by 
supposing that the shadow of a spoon is responsible 
for the experience. By removing the spoon, the 
hypotheses is turned into a probable explanation. On 
the next occasion a habit exists in the memory of the 
interpreting system, the shadow is recognized as due 
to a reflection, the gate is open and no doubt arises.4 
Notice that in the example the final stage is not a 
tautology, it is the unification of a state relation with 
an effect relation, depending on what is present in 
the memory of an interpreting system. Thus a 
difference is established between probable 
knowledge, depending on the knowledge present in 
the given interpretation system and the tautologies of 
logic and mathematics, that in principle must be 
independent of  the specific experience of any given 
interpreter. 
2.2.2 A semiotic interpretation of X-
frame 
In figure 4 the KiF processing model is presented, 
for a detailed treatment the reader is referred to 
(Sarbo, 2011). Here a very superficial treatment 
must suffice. The only precautionary remarks we 
wish to make are: 
(1) that the model regarded as a procedural 
description of interpretation processes only 
_________________ 
4 To our great surprise we recently found, in organization 
theory, a model that is isomorphic with the X-frame 
model. It is the Cynefin framework of (Snowden and 
Kurtz 2003). He distinguishes 5 domains: Chaos (FF), 
Simple (FT), Complex (TF), Complicated (TT) and 
Disorder. Disorder is located in the center, see 
(Snowden, 2007) 
covers what is habitually known, it does not 
cover learning,   
(2) that the model regarded as a semiotic description 
of interpretation processes is suitable for a top 
down as well as for a bottom up interpretation, 
(3) that, at the instant an impression occurs in our 
mind, that mind virtually is in a state, which with 
the impression as an effect interacts.  
 
 
Figure 4: The semiotic KiF processing model with the 
technical semiotic terms pertaining to the sign aspects on 
the right of the slash and the terms pertaining to the 
process that interprets sign types on the left. At the right of 
the box the four different phases that can be discerned are 
given. 
 
We suppose a message and start the analysis with 
our field of perception, the unsorted collection of 
qualisigns. In the sorting phase we single out the 
message in our field of perception, but only as a 
form (iconic) and as being present now (sinsign).  
In the abstraction phase, all interpretational 
possibilities, offered by the present form, are made 
virtually present (rhematic), and, if the impression is 
somehow familiar, which is only one of the 
interpretational possibilities, the form is recognized 
(legisign).  
In the complementation phase the memory is 
addressed (cf. indexical) by the rhematic form and, 
if this form is familiar, also by the recognized form. 
Through the familiar form a concept is retrieved (cf. 
symbolic), let’s say the concept ‘duck’. On the 
propositional side, out of all virtual interpretational 
possibilities, one is chosen that is deemed adequate 
for the state the interpreting system is in. When in a 
restaurant, it is the noun phrase ‘eatable animal’, 
when in a Hooligan brawl, it will more likely be the 
verb phrase ‘evade’.  
If both lines lead to a unifiable result, the 
predication phase sets in and the habit of response, 
that is associated with this result, is triggered. A top 
chef in the bird section, with some spicy off duty 
habits and a tribal attitude, may, when the noun and 
the verb meanings collide, experience a halting 
interpretational process. Is this the case then the next 
state of this interpreting system will be puzzlement 
 concerning which situation ‘duck’ was meant for. 
An effect will be looked for that decides the case. 
 
In the isomorphic X-frame model, the chef is stuck 
in the TT compartment, the implication and 
converse implication prove not unifiable. He could 
as well got stuck in the FT compartment, for 
instance, when indeed he was in a Hooligan fight, 
couldn’t reduce the surrounding noise and had to 
shout: What? But in this case an event, included in 
the interpretational possibilities of the rhematic 
position in the TF compartment, such as, for 
instance, the sudden appearance of a fist in his field 
of vision, could help him over his acoustic problems. 
If all these options fail, the chef got stuck in the 
disorder in the indexical position and is destined to 
end up in the chaos of the FF compartment, with a 
blue eye. 
 2.2.3 Naive and Boolean Logic  
Peirce makes a distinction between an utens and a 
docens of logic and mathematics. The logica utens is 
operative when, in daily circumstances, we 
uncritically apply our inborn capacity for logic. The 
logica docens is active when we critically apply our 
school logic to a case at hand. The utens relates to 
the docens as the analytical mechanics resident in 
the billiard player's nerves, relate to knowledge of 
these mechanics, cf. (Peirce, 1931-1935). 
The naive logical processing scheme developed 
by Farkas and Sarbo provides an answer to the 
question whether the distinction between an utens 
and a docens extends to the logical operations 
themselves. Their answer is affirmative. 
A major difference between naive and Boolean 
logic is that the first can be interpreted as a 
procedure –a series of operations on collections of 
qualia– and the second, as an algebra with 
operations on sets.  As a consequence the collections 
of qualia appear in naïve logic as state and effect, 
while they are abstracted in Boolean logic as logical 
variables. 
There are also other, less important differences 
between the two systems. One of them is the 
possibility in Boolean logic to have any number of 
variables and logical operations in a single 
expression. This is opposed to the limitations of 
`naive' logic, which is a procedure only capable of 
establishing relations between two variables at a 
time and a realization of operations in an order that 
is dictated by the order of sign interactions in the 
processing schema. Another one is the different 
interpretation of logical values (true/false), as a 
representation of the status of cognitive processing 
(`naive' logic) and as a logical constant (Boolean 
logic). This may explain the different way in which 
X-frame and KiF distribute the connectives in the 
diamond. A complete treatment of naive logic can be 
found in (Sarbo, 2011). 
3 PEIRCE, KIF AND SHANNON 
Marty records 76 definitions of the sign that are 
formulated by Peirce in the course of his career.5 A 
suitable definition for our present purposes is the 
following: 6 
 
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in 
such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its 
Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called 
its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to 
its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object 
[...]. (Peirce 1931-1935) 
 
First, Second and Third refer to the categories Peirce 
distinguishes. They respectively stand for monadic 
(sign in regarded in itself), dyadic (sign regarded in 
relation to its object) and triadic (the sign regarded 
as standing in a relation to its object by an 
interpreting thought) relations.  The lower categories 
are involved in the higher, but not the other way 
around. 
Peirce’s categories can be applied recursively in 
order to yield the sign aspects that belong to each of 
the main categorical sign distinctions, (i.j) indicates 
one of the 3 possible categories (i) and one of its 3 
sub categories (j), cf. figure 4. Thus arise, Qualisign 
(monadic,1.1), Sinsign (dyadic,1.2) and Legisign 
(triadic,1.3); Iconic (2.1), Indexical (2.2) and 
Symbolic (2.3); and Rhematic (3.1), Propositional 
(3.2) and Argumentative (3.3). 
The KiF arrangement of semiotic terms results 
from the assumption that the highest sign type, the 
argument, represents a complete cycle of sign action. 
But, since the lower categories are involved in the 
higher, in the execution of an argument or a process 
of interpretation, all sign aspects must be involved. 
From this it follows that we claim to provide a 
semiotic analysis of logical arguments. For a full 
treatment of the semiotic interpretation of the KiF 
model see (Sarbo, 2011). 
_________________ 
5 http://www.cspeirce.com/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm  for  
R. Marty’s listing of the definitions. 
6 It would have been better if Peirce had written, as he did 
elsewhere: “to assume the same or a more informed 
relation”.  
 Let’s assume that the information source and the 
destination in Shannon’s schema consist of 
interpreting systems that process information 
according to KiF, see figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Shannon’s schema with KiF in the source and 
destination positions. 
 
A comparison of Peirce’s incomplete sign definition 
above with Shannon’s statement of his communi-
cation problem learns that, besides a difference in 
viewpoint, the main difference resides in the use of 
terms. Whereas Peirce writes about a sign that raises 
an interpretant sign standing in the same relation to 
its object as the original sign, Shannon writes about 
a message reproduced as exactly as possible. This 
enables the question which part of the KiF inter-
pretation process is at stake in the communication of 
a message when we disregard the meaning problem 
and disregard the technical problem.7  
At the very least, the sign regarded as an object 
that functions as a familiar sign, is needed. But, if a 
sign is a legisign (type),  then the instance (sinsign) 
has a form (iconic) in which qualities (qualisign) are 
involved. Although, all interpretative possibilities, 
which inhere in the rheme position, may be 
considered to be existent, for any given interpreter, 
the interpretative possibilities a sign actually offers 
are dependent on the interaction between a sign and 
a given interpreting system. So, in essence, the 
iconic, the sinsign, and the involved qualisigns, are 
those that must be communicated. All the other sign 
aspects belong to the meaning problem. Semiotics 
offers a structured way to approach this problem. 
 
Shannon’s concept of information is restricted to 
information as data, which is a potential for 
interpretation. Peirce has shown that this potential 
can be developed to nine perspectives on the input. 
From a logical stance these perspectives can be 
associated with Boolean relations. In other words, in 
interpretation we look at the input from all possible 
_________________ 
7 A semiotic treatment of the technical problem would be 
in need of the complete KiF process in order to cover the 
coding and decoding of the message. 
logical perspectives. We suggest that KiF offers a 
schema that enables us to deal with the meaning and 
effectiveness problems in a systematic way. 
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